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Abstract
　This paper presents an additional credit channel for monetary policy that would
arise in the presence of credit rationing. I formally examine a situation in which new
entry firms have no choice but to borrow funds from a financial intermediary to cover
entry costs, taking into account the fact that most of the small and young firms are
bank dependent in practice. It turns out that the presence of nominal debt contracts
allows the central bank to influence firm entry and thereby aggregate output through
its eﬀect on the severity of credit rationing even in the absence of price stickiness. This
is because a decrease in the nominal interest rate reduces the cost of funds for lending,
which enables financial intermediaries to extend credit to less creditworthy firms. This
“credit rationing eﬀect” is absent in the conventional balance-sheet channel, where loan
rates are determined such that credit demand is equal to credit supply.
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1 Introduction
The credit channel of monetary policy has traditionally been divided into two categories:
the bank lending channel (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993, Kashyap and Stein, 2000)
and the balance sheet channel (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999). The bank lending
channel is a supply-driven channel in the sense that monetary policy has real eﬀects through
its influence on bank liquidity. If the central bank tightens monetary policy and the volume
of bank liquidity available for lending is reduced, then financially constrained banks are
forced to cut their lending. Since a decline in the amount of bank lending leads firms to get
other relatively costly sources of funds, such as trade credit, those firms are expected to
reduce capital investment and output. On the other hand, the balance sheet channel is a
demand-driven channel in the sense that monetary policy has real eﬀects through changes
in the cost of borrowing, so called external finance premium. If the value of firms’ net
worth is reduced after a rise in the policy rate, then banks increase their lending rates
since the relative size of external finance to the firm’s net worth increases and extending
credit thus becomes riskier. Such a rise in the borrowing costs weakens the firms’ demand
for external finance, which leads to a decline in investment and output.1
It is widely recognized that small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) are more sus-
ceptible to shifts in monetary policy compared to large firms (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993,
1994, Bougheas et al., 2006). However, there seems to be less agreement about the reason
why. From the point of view of the bank lending channel, SMEs’ investments and output
are more sensitive to monetary policy than larger firms’ since SMEs do not have access to
alternative sources of external finance such as CP or corporate bonds, which are mostly
issued by large firms. This means that more SMEs will become unable to obtain external
funds as the supply of bank loans decreases. Advocators of the balance sheet channel,
on the other hand, argue that SMEs bear the brunt of a tightening of monetary policy
since SMEs’ external finance premium tends to be higher than large firms’ after a rise in
the policy rate (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996). This reduces SMEs’ demand for
external funds to a larger extent than demand by large firms.
In this paper I present an alternative channel of monetary policy in which the central
bank can aﬀect the volume of bank lending by altering the degree of credit rationing.
Although the role of credit rationing has been deemed a key factor in the context of the bank
lending channel, its logic has been criticized since most financial institutions in practice
can usually raise external funds from the financial market in various ways.2 Ashcraft and
Campello (2007) also point out that small banks that are aﬃliated with the same holding
company can reallocate funds internally in response to monetary policy shocks. Ashcraft
and Campello (2007) conclude that borrowers’ creditworthiness is crucial in determining
1See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a survey of the literature on the credit channel.
2See, for example, Bernanke (2007).
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the volume of bank loans. In Bernanke et al.’s (1999) “financial accelerator” model, on the
other hand, the possibility of credit rationing is precluded for the purpose of solving the
model, so that the credit market is always equilibrated. However, various kinds of data
and empirical studies strongly support the existence of credit rationing, and some of them
report that monetary policy influences the degree of credit rationing (e.g., Atanasova and
Wilson, 2004).
Based on Bergin and Corsetti (2005), Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2007,
2008), I explore the eﬀect of monetary policy within a DSGE framework that incorporates
endogenous firm entry.3 As in those endogenous entry models, I assume that potential
entrants have no net worth at the time of entry. It follows that every prospective entrant
is required to raise funds to cover entry costs. The most important departure from these
previous studies is that new entry firms have no choice but to get credit from a financial
intermediary to finance entry costs, while the standard models allow new entry firms to
issue equity. I consider a situation in which other sources of financing such as equity,
commercial papers and corporate bonds are unavailable for prospective entrants.4 In this
environment, every prospective firm tries to enter the market as long as there is a positive
probability of repayment since the expected profit is nonnegative due to the limited liability
property of a debt contract. Accordingly, whether or not a potential firm enters the market
depends fully on the availability of credit.
Following Williamson (1987), Bernanke et al. (1999) and others, financial intermedi-
aries are required to incur auditing costs in order to reveal the state of defaulted firms
(costly state verification). In the presence of auditing costs there would exist a threshold
of loan rates above which the lender can no longer extend credit.5 If the lending rate
is determined at the threshold value, then some applicants will necessarily be unable to
obtain credit. In fact, the analysis shows that credit rationing arises in equilibrium since
prospective entrants continue to try to enter the market until the financial intermediary
becomes unable to extend credit. The number of new firms is determined at a finite value
even though the expected profits of entry are still positive.
It turns out that a change in the nominal interest rate has a significant impact on
real output through its eﬀect on bank lending as long as financial contracts are made in
nominal terms. The intuition for this is as follows: suppose that the central bank cuts
the nominal interest rate, which is the cost of funds for financial intermediaries. Since
3Devereux et al. (1996), Broda and Weinstein (2007) and Bernard, et al. (2006) show that net firm
entry is procyclical and a significant fraction of output fluctuations is attributable to the creation of new
products and the destruction of existing products.
4Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990) provide some reasons why bank lending tends to be the only source of financing
for small firms.
5Another strand of literature, such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), focuses on adverse selection between
lenders and borrowers as the source of credit rationing. See Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990), Tirole (2006) and
Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a survey of the literature on credit rationing.
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a zero profit condition should be met in nominal terms, a reduction in the nominal cost
of funds will allow the financial intermediaries to take higher risks. This implies that a
part of the prospective entrants who are otherwise unable to obtain credit become able
to get credit. Therefore, an expansionary monetary policy enhances new firm entry and
stimulates aggregate output. This “credit rationing channel” diﬀers from the conventional
bank lending channel in that rationing stems not from the lack of bank liquidity, but from
the lack of borrowers’ creditworthiness. In this sense, the credit rationing channel may be
viewed as complementing the traditional balance sheet channel.
The analysis also shows that there arises a procyclicality of net entry and bank loans,
and the countercyclicality of credit spread. Since the number of firms is allowed to vary
over time, macroeconomic shocks have two sorts of impacts on real output: first, a favorable
economic shock increases aggregate output by directly aﬀecting existing firms’ production
(intensive margin). Second, it aﬀects aggregate output by stimulating new firm entry
(extensive margin). An increase in the number of firms expands aggregate output not
only by directly adding new products, but also by indirectly stimulating incumbent firms’
production. It turns out that the extensive margin has a larger influence on output than
the intensive margin.
This paper shares its purpose with Blinder’s (1987) seminal work. Blinder (1987)
examines the role of credit rationing in monetary policy transmission within a system of
ad hoc macroeconomic relations, while I construct a microfounded model with endogenous
firm entry. The influence of monetary policy on firm dynamics is also explored by Bergin
and Corsetti (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008), who assume that new entrants are able to
issue equity to cover entry costs. In their models, a policy shift can aﬀect each firm’s entry
decision through its influence on the firm’s current value as long as price stickiness exists.
In contrast, the real eﬀect of monetary policy considered in this paper does not rely on the
existence of sticky prices. Other studies related to this paper are De Fiore and Tristani
(2008) and Stebunovs (2008). De Fiore and Tristani (2008) considered the role of nominal
financial contract in a model without endogenous entry based on Bernanke et al.’s (1999)
model. Stebunovs (2008) introduced endogenous entry into a DSGE model with banks,
but he considered a situation in which banks’ bargaining power is so strong that they can
collect all the firms’ profits without incurring auditing costs.
2 SMEs’ credit constraints and the real economy: The case
of Japan
Before proceeding to a formal analysis, this section takes a brief look at the Japanese data
regarding the condition of SMEs’ external finance and its relation with the real economy.
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2.1 Two types of credit rationing
In general, credit rationing arises for two reasons. One is the lack of borrower’s credit-
worthiness. If a loan applicant is judged unable to yield a suﬃcient amount of profits in
the future, then the expected net return of lending will be negative and the bank will not
extend credit. Let us call this sort of rationing type-D credit rationing since it stems from
a demand-side reason. The other possibility is that banks cannot extend credit even when
the net expected return of lending is nonnegative. This situation arises either when banks
cannot collect enough funds for lending, as the theory of bank lending channel insists, or
when banks are constrained by the bank-capital requirements. Financial institutions that
do not have enough capital are required to control the total amount of loans to meet bank
capital requirements.6 If this is the case, the source of SMEs’ diﬃculty in external finance
stems from banks’ balance-sheet condition rather than applicants’ credit worthiness. Let
us call this type of rationing type-S credit rationing since it is caused by a supply-side
factor.
A necessary condition for the theoretical analysis of this paper to be valid is that the
size of type-D rationing is economically significant. It can be said that type-D credit
rationing always exists in practice, while type-S rationing may be absent as long as banks
have enough capital and the liquidity available for lending is abundant. However, it is
beyond the scope of this paper to quantify to what extent actual SMEs are constrained by
type-D rationing, although I show some evidence of its existence. The purpose of this paper
is not to replace the widely recognized policy transmission mechanism, but to investigate
the possibility of an additional channel of monetary policy transmission.
Examining the existence of credit rationing in a formal way is necessarily diﬃcult since
it requires an identification of loan demand. One possible way is to apply an econometric
method that can be used for disequilibrium models (e.g., Madala and Nelson, 1974, Gerso-
vitz, 1980). In this strategy, demand and supply functions for loans are estimated and
the estimates are then used to figure out if credit rationing exists.7 In the following, I in-
stead show more direct evidence for the presence of rationing using survey data concerning
Japanese SMEs.
2.2 Limited availability of credit for SMEs: Evidence from survey data
First of all, I show data taken from the Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises,
which is published by the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprise Agency every year.
Table 1 reports the proportion of SMEs for which the application of a bank loan has been
6Van den Heuvel (2006) investigates the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy when a bank capital requirement
matters.
7Atanasova and Wilson (2004) adopt this strategy using the UK data.
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denied by their “main banks” in the past year.8 It reveals that at least 6- 9.16% of loan
applicants had their loan application refused or the amount of it reduced. One might think
that this fraction is not significant, but there are at least two possibilities that this may be
misleading. First, there is a strong possibility that there exists “discouraged borrowers”,
who did not apply for loans because they thought they would be rejected even though they
needed funds. Unfortunately, precise data on the number of discouraged borrowers is not
available regarding Japanese SMEs, but the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF)
2003 in the US reports that 17.9% of SMEs turns out to be discouraged borrowers.9 The
proportion of discouraged borrowers would not be much smaller in Japan than in the US.
The second limitation of the above survey data is that young firms that have launched
over the past few years are not included due to the unavailability of real-time information.
For example, the sample firms included in the Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enter-
prises 2008 are taken based on information available at the Establishment and Enterprise
Census 2006 published by the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications.10 It is ex-
pected that younger and smaller firms are more financially constrained compared to older
and larger SMEs. If this is the case, the extent of credit rationing will be more severe
than the above data suggests. To examine this possibility, the diﬀerence in the fraction of
SMEs that have some problems with external finance is shown in Table 2. It states that
among the SMEs that are at the initial stage of firm growth, 38.7% of them answered that
there is a problem with external financing. The corresponding fraction reduces to 2.6% for
the most developed SMEs. This strongly suggests that the fraction of firms that have a
problem obtaining funds shown in Table 1 is biased downward in that the Basic Survey of
Small and Medium Enterprises does not include the youngest SMEs that are most likely
to be financially constrained.
Next, let us look at some judgment surveys taken from TANKAN, which is published
by the Bank of Japan on a quarterly basis. Figure 1 shows the judgment survey of SMEs
on changes in the lending attitudes of financial institutions, lending rates and the easiness
with which SMEs get external funds. According to these data, there is a strong correlation
between the financial institutions’ lending attitude and the easiness with which SMEs
obtain external finance: an accommodative lending attitude makes it easier for firms to get
external funds. This correlation could be viewed as supporting the conventional balance
sheet channel as long as the ease of obtaining external finance stems from changes in the
cost of borrowing. However, the figure reveals that SMEs’ diﬃculty in external finance is
not necessarily positively correlated to the level of lending rates, which implies that SMEs
8There can be various definitions of “main bank”, but the Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises
directly asks each SME who its main bank is.
9SSBF 2003 also reports that 85.1% of loan applicants have always been approved and 10.3% have always
been denied.
10This type of information lag varies each year since the Establishment and Enterprise Census is not
conducted every year. The maximum lag is 4 years.
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do not regard the cost of borrowing as the only source of financing diﬃculty. There must
be another reason why SMEs have problems obtaining external finance. The time-varying
severity of rationing is one possible factor that prevents the diﬃculty of external finance
and cost of borrowing from moving in tandem.
As noted above, decomposing the observed rationing into type-S and type-D is beyond
the scope of this paper, but some data appear to support the presence of type-D rationing.
Table 3 reports that about 50% of SMEs that feel financial institutions’ credit standard
has been made more stringent attribute the reason to the fact that their profitability has
deteriorated while 43.8% of SMEs answer that the increasing diﬃculty in obtaining external
funds stems from financial institutions’ problems. In addition, as is shown in Table 2, the
fact that the fraction of SMEs that have some problems with external financing declines
with firm age implies that the availability of credit depends largely on demand-side factors.
2.3 Loans from financial institutions and firms’ entry and exit
If the source of credit rationing comes from the lack of SMEs’ credit worthiness, then the
ease of obtaining bank loans should be procyclical. From Figure 2, it appears that SMEs’
net operating profits lead the ease of external finance, which implies that an increase in
the current net profits makes it easier to obtain credit the following year. The coeﬃcient of
correlation between the current ease of finance and the one-year lag of net profits is 0.49,
while the correlation coeﬃcient between the current ease of finance and current net profits
is 0.28.
Let us turn to the relationship between external finance and firms’ entry and exit. If a
certain fraction of SMEs cannot get credit and the severity of rationing is captured by the
above judgment survey regarding the ease in finance, then the index is expected to have a
positive correlation with the number of new firm entries since launching new firms usually
requires external funds which are diﬃcult to obtain in periods when the financial market is
tight. Figure 3 shows this is indeed the case. There is a strong positive correlation between
the number of newly launched firms and the ease of obtaining external finance. Figure 4
illustrates the ease in finance, the number of corporate bankruptcies and the growth rate of
loans. It reveals that the number of bankruptcies has a close correlation both with SMEs’
financing ease and with the growth rate of outstanding loans. While these figures do not
exclude the possibility that changes in the diﬃculty in external financing is caused by the
procyclical fluctuation of bank capital, any formal model that introduces credit rationing
should be able to replicate such a pattern of firms’ entries and exits.
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3 The Model
The model economy consists of a representative household, good-producing firms, a fi-
nancial intermediary, a central bank, and the government. The representative household
consumes a variety of consumption goods while supplying labor service in the goods sector.
Since the number of firms is allowed to vary over time, goods firms can be classified into
two groups: incumbents and new entrants. New entry firms have to employ a fixed amount
of labor in order to make preparations for production at the beginning of the period. The
required cost of hiring labor can be viewed as a barrier to entry. In order to cover this entry
cost, new entrants have to raise funds in the financial market before producing goods. I
consider a situation in which new entrants can borrow funds only from a financial interme-
diary. Unlike the previous endogenous entry models, new entrants are not allowed to issue
equity. Since additional borrowing is not available at the end of the entry period, they
go bankrupt if they fail to earn enough profits to repay the principal plus interest to the
financial intermediary. Specifically, firms will go bankrupt if they are hit by an idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock that is smaller than the endogenously determined threshold. The
sequence of events is shown in Figure 4.
3.1 Households
The one-period utility function of a representative household is given as
Ut = logCt − η
Z
i∈Ωt
Lt(i)
1+φ
1 + φ di− η˜
Z
j∈Ωet
ft(j)
1+φ˜
1 + φ˜ dj, φ, φ˜, η, η˜ > 0
where Ct ≡
hR
i∈Ωt Ct(i)
θ−1
θ di
i θ
θ−1
, and Ct(i) and Lt(i) are the consumption of diﬀerentiated
good i and hours worked for the production of consumption good i, respectively. θ (> 1)
denotes the elasticity of substitution between the variety of goods. Ωt ⊂ Ω is the set of
total variety of goods available in period t. Ωet ⊂ Ωt denotes the set of production variety
produced by new entrants. The mass of total firms including new entrants is denoted
by Nt, while the mass of new entrants is denoted by N
E
t . ft(j) represents hours worked
at new entry firm j in preparation for production. The optimization of the allocation of
consumption goods yields the aggregate price index Pt ≡
hR
i∈Ωt Pt(i)
1−θdi
i 1
1−θ , where Pt(i)
denotes the price of good i.
The household needs to use cash to purchase consumption goods. At the begin-
ning of period t, the amount of cash available for the purchase of consumption goods
is Mt +
R
j∈Ωet
W˜t(j)ft(j)dj − St, where Mt is the nominal balance held from period t − 1
to t, and
R
j∈Ωet
W˜t(j)ft(j)dj represents the total nominal preparatory-labor wage paid by
new entrants at the beginning of period t. The production-labor wage
R
i∈ΩtWt(i)Lt(i)di
is paid after production has started. The household also makes a one-period deposit St
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at the beginning of the period, the interest on which, Rt, is paid at the end of the pe-
riod. Accordingly, the following cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint must be satisfied at the
beginning of period t:11
PtCt ≤Mt +
Z
j∈Ωet
W˜t(j)ft(j)dj − St.
The household’s budget constraint is given by
Mt+1 =Mt +
Z
j∈Ωet
W˜t(j)ft(j)dj − St − PtCt +RtSt +
Z
i∈Ωt
Wt(i)Lt(i)di+Πt − Tt
where Πt denotes the sum of profits transferred from firms and the financial intermediary,
and Tt is a lump-sum tax. Since the CIA constraint holds with equality in each period as
long as there is an opportunity cost of holding cash, the budget constraint can be rewritten
as:
PtCt + St =
Z
j∈Ωet
W˜t(j)ft(j)dj +Rt−1St−1 +
Z
i∈Ωt−1
Wt−1(i)Lt−1(i)di+Πt−1 − Tt−1.
Due to the CIA constraint, the production-labor wage income in period t,
R
i∈ΩtWt(i)Lt(i)di,
cannot be used until period t+1 while the preparatory-labor wage income,
R
j∈Ωet
W˜t(j)ft(j)dj,
can be spent in period t.
The first-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are
R−1t = Et
βPtCt
Pt+1Ct+1
, (1)
W˜t
Pt
= η˜Ctf φ˜t , (2)
βEt Wt(i)
Pt+1Ct+1
= ηLφt (i), (3)
where β and Et are the subjective discount factor and the expectations operator conditional
on information in period t. I assume that the amount of labor required for the preparation
of production is independent of production level and is identical across firms (ft(j) = ft >
0, ∀j). Accordingly, the nominal wage W˜t turns out to be identical across new firms. The
first two conditions are fairly standard. Eq. (3) says that current disutility of labor must
equal to the real wage evaluated in terms of future price level and future marginal utility of
consumption. This is because the production-labor wages cannot be spent until the next
period while the household incurs disutility of labor today. Using the Euler equation (1),
this relation can be rewritten as
Wt(i)
Pt
= ηRtCtLφt (i). (4)
11It is assumed that financial markets open before the goods market.
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Eq. (4) is a labor supply condition that equates the real wage to the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. However, unlike the standard case, the
nominal interest rate Rt also appears in the relation. The presence of Rt represents the
distortion stemming from the time lag between the earning and spending of wage income.
As will be seen below, the nominal interest rate has a real impact on the economy due to
this time-lag. An intuitive reason for the appearance of the nominal interest rate in (4) is
as follows. In the optimal equilibrium, the current disutility of labor must equal to “future
real wage”, Wt(i)/Pt+1, times future marginal utility of consumption, C
−1
t+1. On the one
hand, the diﬀerence between the current real wage, Wt(i)/Pt, and “future real wage” is
given by the rate of inflation. On the other hand, the Euler equation (1) suggests that the
diﬀerence between the current and the future marginal utility of consumption is given by
the real rate of interest. Therefore, when optimality condition (3) is expressed exclusively
by time-t variables, inflation terms oﬀset each other and only the nominal interest rate
term remains.
3.2 Goods sector
Each goods firm produces a diﬀerentiated product after observing productivity shocks.
The production function takes a form of a constant-returns-to-scale function:12
Yt(i) = (Zt + zt(i))Lt(i), (5)
where Yt(i), Zt and zt(i) denote output, a common productivity shock and an idiosyncratic
productivity shock, respectively. Zt takes a positive value for all t.
There are three economic agents who consume goods: the household, the government
and the financial intermediary. The financial intermediary is a consumer of goods since
auditing costs take the form of consumption spending. All agents have an identical elasticity
of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods, which means that they will demand the same
consumption basket. It follows that the goods demand function is simply given by
Yt(i) = ρ−θt (i)Yt, (6)
where ρt(i) = Pt(i)/Pt and Yt = Ct +Gt + ξt. Gt and ξt denote the consumption baskets
purchased by the government and the financial intermediary, respectively. In the follow-
ing, I assume that the government spending is determined such that Ct = γYt and hence
Gt + ξt = (1 − γ)Yt, where γ ∈ (0, 1). This implies that fluctuations in ξt are completely
absorbed by the corresponding shift in the government spending so as to keep the house-
hold’s consumption a constant fraction of aggregate output. The reason for imposing this
assumption is twofold: first, it is natural to consider that the contribution of auditing costs
12The essential results below will not change even when we allow for the possibility of decreasing returns
to scale.
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incurred by financial institutions to GDP is negligible compared to that of household con-
sumption and government spending. Second, this simplification enables us to analytically
prove the existence and the uniqueness of the financial market equilibrium. Without this
assumption, there arise trivial second and higher order eﬀects of a change in ξt on output.
This is because ξt depends on firms’ profits, which depend on aggregate output, which
depends on ξt, and so forth.
Goods prices are flexible. The relative price of good i is then given as
ρt(i) =
µ θ
θ − 1
¶
Wt(i)
Pt(Zt + zt(i))
. (7)
Using (4) - (7) and the relation Yt =
hR
i∈Ωt Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
i θ
θ−1
, the aggregate output can be
expressed as
Yt =
∙µ θ
θ − 1
¶
γηRt
¸ −1
1+φ
∙Z
i∈Ωt
(Zt + zt(i))
αdi
¸ 1
α
=
∙µ θ
θ − 1
¶
γηRt
¸ −1
1+φ
N
1
α
t
∙Z zu
0
g(z)(Zt + z)
αdz
¸ 1
α
, (8)
where α ≡ (θ − 1)(1 + φ)/(1 + θφ), and g(z) denotes the density function of idiosyncratic
shock z ∈ (0, zu). As is clear from the equation, an increase in the mass of firms will
expand the aggregate output, and a reduction in the nominal interest rate will also have a
positive impact on output. As I mentioned above, the latter eﬀect simply comes from the
time lag between the payment and the usage of production-labor wages.
Let dt(i) denote the real profit of firm i. When i denotes a new entry firm, dt(i)
corresponds to the real profit prior to the repayment to the financial intermediary.13 The
diversity in dt(i) among firms can be expressed solely by the diﬀerence in idiosyncratic
shocks:
dt(i) =
1
θYt(i)
θ−1
θ Y
1
θ
t
=
1
θ (Zt + zt(i))
α
∙µ θ
θ − 1
¶
γηRt
¸ −1
1+φ
N
1−α
α
t Z˜
1−α
t , (9)
where Z˜t ≡ [
R zu
0 g(z)(Zt + z)
αdz]
1
α . Whether or not a rise in Nt leads to an increase in the
profits depends on the parameter (1− α)/α. This is because firm entry has two opposite
eﬀects on the demand for each good. While a rise in Nt expands aggregate output and thus
stimulates the demand for each individual good, it also has an eﬀect of diluting the demand
for individual goods. α is shown to be smaller than unity under the baseline parameter
values described below, which generates a widely observed procyclicality of profits.
13New entrants pay the right amount of wages to workers before paying back to the financial intermediary.
Note that this is always possible since dt(i) is nonnegative.
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As in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2007, 2008), incumbent firms suﬀer
from a “death shock” with probability δ at the end of each period. Those firms hit by a
death shock will go out of business immediately. On the other hand, new entry firms exit
the market if they fail to repay the loan amount to the financial intermediary. Thus, the
dynamics of the mass of firms are given as
Nt = N
I
t +N
E
t , (10)
N It = (1− δ)N It−1 + (1− xt−1)NEt−1, (11)
where N It denotes the mass of incumbent firms in period t, which is a state variable in
period t. xt represents the probability of default.
Every new entry firm is required to hire a fixed amount of labor, ft, at the beginning
of the period. As in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2007, 2008), the labor
needed to build new firm is expressed as ft = fE/Zt. fE is assumed to be constant since the
eﬀect of entry regulation or deregulation is not of interest here. This specification suggests
that the required labor cost at the time of entry will decrease as common productivity
improves.
3.3 Financial intermediary
Let us turn to the financial contract between new entry firms and the financial intermediary.
Before observing idiosyncratic productivity shocks, but after a common productivity shock
is realized, each prospective entrant borrows funds from the financial intermediary in order
to pay entry cost W˜tft. They cannot raise capital in other ways such as equity, trade
credits, corporate bonds, commercial paper, etc.
Here, I consider a situation in which a debt contract is made in nominal terms. The
lending rate, Rlt, is determined according to the following risk-neutral no-arbitrage condi-
tion:
(1− xt)RltW˜tft + (1− μ)
Z z¯t
0
g(z)Ptdt(z)dz = RtW˜tft, μ ∈ (0, 1) (12)
where z¯t denotes the threshold of idiosyncratic productivity shocks below which firms
go into bankruptcy. As in Williamson (1987) and Bernanke et al. (1999), the financial
intermediary has to incur auditing costs in order to reveal the state of defaulted firms. As
is well known, in the presence of such costs, there would arise a threshold of idiosyncratic
shocks above which the lender can no longer extend credit. This is because a rise in the
threshold will increase the probability of default and thereby increase the expected cost of
auditing while a rise in the threshold has a direct positive eﬀect on its revenue through a
rise in the lending rate. Following Bernanke et al. (1999), I assume that the auditing costs
take a form such that the financial intermediary spends a certain fraction of its revenue on
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final goods consumption. This leads to ξt = μ R z¯t0 g(z)dt(z)dz.14 Since prospective entrants
are ex ante identical, the financial intermediary assigns an identical loan rate to all firms.
There exists at least two sorts of financial market imperfections here. One is the
presence of auditing costs, ξt > 0. The other is the unavailability of additional liquidity at
the end of each period. If financial markets were perfect, then the financial intermediary
would try to avoid having firms default by extending additional credit since the firms
would continue to earn a positive amount of profits as long as they are alive. In such
situations, new entrants could get the same amount of external funds as their discounted
value of expected profits, and the financial market structure of this model will basically
be the same as that of the standard endogenous entry models. This model does not
allow such a possibility of additional borrowing since firms are forced to go bankrupt
before financial markets reopen. One possible rationale of this situation is that financial
institutions do not have accurate information about the future profitability of new entrants.
This unavailability of additional credit will keep the mass of new entrants below the eﬃcient
level.15
Since the central bank injects money into the financial intermediary at the beginning
of each period, the financial market equilibrium condition is given as
NEt W˜tft = St +∆Mt+1,
where ∆Mt+1 ≡ Mt+1 − Mt. Accordingly, the profits of the financial intermediary are
Rt∆Mt+1, which are transferred to the household at the end of the period.
As a preparation for analyzing equilibrium dynamics, let us express eq. (12) in terms of
threshold z¯t and the mass of total firms Nt. First of all, the threshold of default is defined
implicitly as
Ptdt(z¯t) = R
l
tW˜tft. (13)
It follows that the probability of default, xt, can be given as
xt = Prob(Ptdt(zt) < R
l
tW˜tft)
= Prob(zt < z¯t)
= G(z¯t),
where G(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of idiosyncratic shocks. Then, eq.
14An advantage of this specification of auditing costs is that the financial intermediary always has an
incentive to audit since auditing is always beneficial.
15Although this paper does not specify a particular microfounded rationale for why the financial interme-
diary refuses to continue to extend further credit to firms in default, various reasons were proposed in the
previous studies. For instance, Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) insisted that a credible threat of cutting oﬀ credit
will reduce the likelihood that the borrowers undertake risky projects. Jaﬀee and Stiglitz (1990) provide a
brief review of studies on this topic.
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(12) leads to
(1−G(z¯t))dt(z¯t) + (1− μ)
Z z¯t
0
g(z)dt(z)dz =
RtW˜tft
Pt
,
Or, owing to the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the financial contract can be expressed
in a more simple form by eliminating terms that are common to both sides of the equation.
(1−G(z¯t))(Zt + z¯t)α + (1− μ)
Z z¯t
0
g(z)(Zt + z)
αdz = θη˜γf1+φ˜t Z˜αt RtNt. (14)
Note that the “time-lag eﬀect” regarding the wage income has no impact on this financial
contract since the term R
− 1
1+φ
t appears in every term of eq. (12) and they cancel out each
other. For later use, let us define Γ(z¯t;Zt) as follows:
Γ(z¯t;Zt) ≡ (1−G(z¯t))(Zt + z¯t)α + (1− μ)
Z z¯t
0
g(z)(Zt + z)
αdz.
This can be interpreted as the “quasi-expected revenue” from an individual loan.
4 Firm dynamics and the role of credit rationing
4.1 Firm entry
Now, let us consider the dynamics of firm entry and exit. There is an infinite mass of
prospective entrants. Since the prospective entrants have never produced goods before
entering the market, they have no net worth at first. Those entrants will try to enter the
market if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
(1−G(z¯t))
"Z zu
z¯t
g(z)
1−G(z¯t)
dt(z)dz −
RltW˜tft
Pt
+ Vt
#
> 0,
where Vt denotes the discounted value of expected profits from period t+1 onward. Notice
that since entrants have nothing to lose, their net benefit is zero in the case of default. We
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Prospective firms will try to enter the market if Nt is positive finite and
z¯t < zu.
Proof : The expected profit conditional on repayment is always nonnegative since the
following inequality holds:Z zu
z¯t
g(z)
1−G(z¯t)
dt(z)dz ≥ dt(z¯t) =
RltW˜tft
Pt
.
From eq.(9), this inequality holds strictly if Nt is finite and z¯t < zu. Since the sum of
expected discounted profits from period t + 1 onward is nonnegative, the proposition is
proven.
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This proposition implies that firm entry continues as long as bank credit is available
and there is a positive probability of repayment. The question is: how can the mass of
firms be determined at a finite value? We will see in the next section that there arises
credit rationing in equilibrium, and thereby Nt and N
E
t are uniquely determined at finite
values.
4.2 Equilibrium credit rationing
The discussion above implies that the total demand for funds is basically infinite since an
unbounded mass of prospective firms tries to enter the market. Therefore, the determina-
tion of the mass of new entrants, NEt , depends fully on the financial intermediary’s supply
of funds. In other words, there is always room for an “eﬀective supply” of funds as long as
NEt is finite.
16
In order to see how NEt is determined, we have to see eq. (14) in more detail. First
of all, in order to exclude a trivial situation in which the probability of default is one, the
LHS of (14), Γ(z¯t;Zt), must have a global maximum at z¯t = z¯∗t < zu. If this is not the case,
it is optimal for the financial intermediary to set z¯t at zu so that no firm will be able to
survive. In fact, whether this is the case or not depends on the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks.17 In the following, I assume that idiosyncratic shocks are uniformly distributed
over (0, zu).
The first-order diﬀerentiation of Γ(z¯t;Zt) with respect to z¯t leads to
Γ0(z¯t;Zt) = (Zt + z¯t)α
h
α(1−G(z¯t))(Zt + z¯t)−1 − μg(z¯t)
i
= (Zt + z¯t)
α
∙
α(1− z¯t
zu
)(Zt + z¯t)
−1 − μ
zu
¸
. (15)
It follows that Γ(z¯t;Zt) attains the global maximum at
z¯t =
αzu − μZt
α+ μ
≡ z¯∗t . (16)
Recall that the bank will lend funds as long as the equilibrium condition (14) is satisfied.
This implies that more and more firms will be entering the market in the situation in which
(14) would be still satisfied even after the firms’ entry is included in Nt. Consequently, the
equilibrium is attained at zt = z¯
∗
t . The probability of default turns out to be less than one
since z¯∗t < zu implies μ(zu + Zt) > 0, which holds as long as there is a positive auditing
cost. In the absence of auditing costs, zu becomes identical to z¯
∗
t and all the new entrants
will go bankrupt. On the other hand, z¯∗t must be greater than zero to ensure xt > 0, which
requires Zt < αzu/μ. Let us summarize the results as follows:
16The practical importance of “eﬀective supply” was stressed by Blinder (1987).
17Bernanke et al. (1999) assumed that the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks has a decreasing-hazard
property in order to eliminate the situation in which the probability of default is one in equilibrium.
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Proposition 2 If μ ∈ (0,αzu/Zt), then the equilibrium probability of default lies between
0 and 1, and Nt is uniquely determined at a positive finite value.
Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium relation. Depending on the size of the common
shocks realized at the beginning of period t, there are two possible cases prior to the
adjustment of Nt. The first situation is that the “quasi-cost of funds”, RHS of (14), lies
below the maximum of quasi-expected revenue, Γ(z¯∗t ;Zt) (CC). In this case, a financial
contract would be made at B provided that the mass of total firms were unchanged.18 In
fact, the mass of total firms will instantly increase until the quasi-cost line reaches Γ(z¯∗t ;Zt).
The equilibrium value of Nt equalizes the quasi-cost of funds with Γ(z¯∗t ;Zt).
CC in figure 6 corresponds to the situation in which the financial intermediary can
increase its credit supply due either to a decline in the cost of funds or to an increase in
the expected revenue (after subtracting auditing costs). In either case, the default risk
will be reduced prior to the start of firm entry, so that the financial intermediary becomes
able to extend more credit than before until credit rationing arises. Another possible
situation is that the cost of funds is greater than the expected revenue (DD). In this case,
no prospective entrants can get funds, so that the mass of total firms must decline relative
to the previous period’s level.
In the literature, this type of credit rationing is called “pure credit rationing” (Jaﬀee
and Stiglitz, 1990) or “type-II credit rationing” (Keeton, 1979), where some people can get
the full amount of credit they demand while apparently identical people cannot.19 In the
model, the presence of the excess demand for funds can be confirmed by the fact that Nt is
finite and z¯t < zu, in which case the entry condition is still satisfied with strict inequality.
It follows that the eﬀective supply of liquidity to those prospective entrants who cannot
obtain credit is a key to stimulating aggregate output. Notice that the source of rationing
is not related to the financial intermediary’s financial position. This is a situation in which
the financial intermediary can obtain external funds as much as it wants, and there is no
regulation for the volume of loans. Hence, this situation corresponds to the type-D credit
rationing defined in section 2.
An interesting feature concerning firm dynamics is that the response of Nt to common
economic shocks is asymmetric, depending on the size of the shocks. To see this, recall
that Nt is expressed as the sum of N
E
t and a state variable N
I
t . This implies that N
I
t is a
lower bound for Nt since N
E
t is nonnegative. Therefore, if the size of an unfavorable shock
is suﬃciently large so that θη˜γf1+φ˜t Z˜αt RtN It > Γ(z¯∗t ;Zt), then the mass of new entrants
will necessarily be zero. Moreover, such a situation may persist for some periods until
the equality (14) is restored. In contrast, as far as favorable shocks are concerned, the
18Note that the right intersection does not make sense since the financial intermediary can earn positive
profits by lowering the threshold.
19In contrast, the presence of a binding collateral constraint is an example of type-I rationing, where
some agents cannot get the desired amount of credit.
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equilibrium can always be attained at z¯t = z¯
∗
t since there is no upper bound for N
E
t . I will
later discuss the implications of this asymmetric feature in more detail.
5 Equilibrium dynamics
5.1 Equilibrium equations
In the following, I solve the model by focusing on nine endogenous aggregate variables
Nt, N
I
t , N
E
t , xt, z¯t, Yt, R
l
t, dt(z¯t), W˜t/Pt. The rest of the endogenous aggregate variables,
such as the real interest rate, can be determined residually. Table 4 summarizes the equi-
librium equations that are used to solve for the nine endogenous variables. As for the
process of exogenous shocks, I employ the following simple autoregressive process:
Zt = Z
ρz
t−1Z
1−ρz²zt
Rt = R
ρr
t−1R
1−ρr²rt ,
where Z and R denote the steady state values of common productivity shock and the nom-
inal interest rate, respectively. ²it, i = z, r represent temporary shocks to the corresponding
variable.
If one focuses on the nine endogenous variables listed above, the model can be solved
analytically without relying on linearization technique because there is no expectation term
in the related equilibrium equations. Steady states of those variables are summarized in
Appendix.20
5.2 Impulse response
5.2.1 Calibration
The baseline parameter values are as follows: as for the utility parameter, φ = 2, φ˜ = 1,
η = η˜ = 1, and β = .99. R is set at 1/.99. The consumption-GDP ratio, γ, is .6 and the
mean of common productivity shocks is set at 1. Following Bilbiie et al. (2007, 2008), I
employ θ = 3.8, and fE is determined such that it equals to the steady state individual
production labor, Y/[(Z+ zu/2)N
θ/(θ−1)]. This leads to fE = 2.977.
21 Bilbiie et al. (2007,
2008) set δ at .025 to match the U.S. data for job destruction, which is 10% per year. In
20Since the process of nominal interest rate is exogenously given, the aggregate price level will be inde-
terminate as long as the public forms rational expectations (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Nevertheless, the
public’s expectation formation is left unspecified in obtaining the solutions for the above nine endogenous
variables, so that the price level is not necessarily indeterminate if the public’s expectation formation is not
rational.
21In fact, this procedure is possible only if φ 6= φ˜. This is why I set φ˜ at a value lower than φ. Setting
φ < φ˜ does not change qualitative results. However, imposing a high value of φ˜ will create an extremely
large amplification of productivity shocks. This is because the extent of reduction of the entry cost in
response to a positive productivity shock increases with φ˜.
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this model, however, there are two exit rates, δ and x. The total exit rate in the steady
state is NE/N = δ/(1 − x + δ). I set the values of δ and zu such that NE/N = .025,
introducing the assumption that the default probability of new entrants is twice as high
as incumbent firms. It results in δ = .024 and zu = .130.22 The auditing cost parameter,
μ is set at .12, following Bernanke, et al. (1999). With these parameter values, the steady
state credit spread, defined as Rl − R, is .025 per annum. The AR coeﬃcients ρz and ρr
are both set at .9.
5.2.2 A common productivity shock
Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of the impact of a positive common productivity
shock. The eﬀect is twofold. First, a rise in Zt decreases the quantity of each firm’s demand
for funds by reducing the preparatory labor needed for entry, ft. This is reflected by a
downward shift of the horizontal line (DD→ EE). While a rise in Zt also has an eﬀect of
increasing Z˜αt , this eﬀect is relatively smaller compared to the decrease in ft. Second, a
positive productivity shock also moves Γ(·) upward, which corresponds to an improvement
in the profitability of borrowers. Consequently, after a positive common productivity shock
hits the economy, there arises room for the mass of firms to rise. The new equilibrium is
attained at C since firm entry continues until the horizontal line is tangent to Γ(·). The
value of z¯ that maximizes Γ(·) is shifted leftward, so that the equilibrium probability of
default is lowered.
Figure 8 illustrates impulse responses to a positive (annualized) one-percent deviation
of the common productivity shock from the steady state. The path of each variable is
shown in terms of the deviation from the corresponding steady state. The figures shows
that an improvement in the common productivity increases the mass of firms, the aggregate
and per-firm output and the average profit. In particular, the procyclicality of profits and
the number of firms has been confirmed by some previous studies such as Devereux et al.
(1996), Bergin and Corsetti (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2007) for the US data. The model
is also able to replicate a positive relationship between the volume of loans and firm entry,
which is neglected by the standard entry models.
There is also a negative relationship between the credit spread and Nt. To understand
this, recall that the loan rate is determined according to the relation Rlt = dt(z¯t)/(W˜tft/Pt),
which represents the ratio of the threshold profit to the amount of loan. It is straightforward
to show that this ratio is decreasing in Nt. This states that an increase in the mass of firms
will increase the amount of each loan relative to the threshold profit due to a rise in the
labor cost. Other things being equal, this leads to a deterioration in the creditworthiness of
borrowers. In order to maintain a certain degree of default risk, the financial intermediary
has to cut the loan rate so as to keep the borrowers’ burden unchanged. Provided Rt is
22Setting δ = x generates virtually the same results.
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constant, this will reduce the credit spread.
5.2.3 A monetary policy shock and the credit rationing channel
Next, let us examine the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. Since goods prices are flexible,
the standard interest channel of monetary policy through the Euler equation does not work
here. Instead, there are two alternative channels: first, a change in Rt influences the house-
hold’s labor supply decision, (4), because there is a time lag between the payment and the
usage of production-labor wages. Second, a shift in Rt aﬀects the financial intermediary’s
loan supply by changing the cost of funds. Since a financial contract is made in nominal
terms, a change in the nominal cost of funds can change the total amount of loans that
can be extended to prospective entrants.
Figure 9 shows impulse responses to a (annualized) one-percent cut in the nominal
interest rate. As output and profits are aﬀected by the wage-lag eﬀect as well as a change
in Nt, the figure also shows impulse responses under no wage-lag eﬀects.23 It is shown that
the relative importance of the wage-lag eﬀects is limited in the case of aggregate output,
while per-firm output and average profit are largely aﬀected by such an eﬀect. This is in
part because per-firm profit and average profit are little influenced by changes in Nt when
the parameter (1− α)/α is very small.24
The figure suggests that the credit rationing channel of monetary policy may play a
significant role in the policy transmission mechanism. It turns out that a shift in monetary
policy can have significant real eﬀects through its eﬀect on credit supply. A cut in the
nominal interest rate will lead the financial intermediary to increase credit by reducing the
cost of funds. The intuition is that a reduction in the cost of funds allows the expected
(nominal) revenue of each lending to decrease, which enables the financial intermediary to
extend credit to less creditworthy borrowers. This enlarges prospective entrants’ opportu-
nities to obtain credit and thus promotes firm entry, and consequently the level of loan rate
decreases. Recall that a rise in the mass of total firms exacerbates the creditworthiness of
prospective entrants by increasing the labor wage to a larger extent than expected profits.
The figure also reveals that the loan rate decreases more than proportionately in re-
sponse to a decline in Rt so that credit spread declines. Provided that the credit spread
remains unchanged, extending credit to less creditworthy borrowers necessarily increases
the risk of default, but a reduction in the spread allows the default risk to remain constant.
In other words, a reduction in the credit spread will rebalance the borrowers’ burden by
reducing the interest payment while increasing the principal component due to a rise in
the labor cost.
23I do this by eliminating the interest terms appearing in the output equation (8) and profit function (9).
Of course, the resultant equilibrium is not theoretically meaningful, but this is done just for measuring the
pure eﬀect of the credit rationing channel.
24(1− α)/α is .024 under the baseline parameter values.
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5.2.4 Intensive and extensive margin
I showed that changes in Zt or Rt have significant influences on output. In fact, these
real eﬀects can be distinguished into two categories: intensive and extensive margins. By
intensive margin I mean the extent to which the shift in output is generated by an expansion
of existing products. On the other hand, extensive margin refers to the extent to which
the output fluctuation is due to a change in the variety of products. If the extensive
margin turns out to be significantly large, then it implies that firm dynamics will be a
major contributing factor to business fluctuations. The eﬀectiveness of the credit rationing
channel will be most profound in such situations.
Figure 10 illustrates the output responses attributable to the intensive margin.25 It
also shows the total output responses so that we can figure out the extent of the extensive
margin. It turns out that in both shocks, the intensive margin can explain only about one-
third of total output fluctuations. Although a productivity shock has a direct influence on
output through the production function, its impact is magnified by the presence of credit
constraint.
In the case of a policy shock, the only source of the intensive margin is the wage-lag
eﬀect. Hence, the figure is essentially the same as the output response shown in Figure
9. As noted above, a change in Nt is quantitatively a more important source of output
fluctuation than the wage-lag eﬀect.
5.2.5 Credit crunch
Finally, let us consider the implication of the asymmetric feature in the adjustment of Nt.
As briefly discussed above, the nonnegativity of NEt creates a lower bound for Nt, N
I
t . For
this reason, there arises a possibility that the equilibrium condition (14) might not hold
if a large negative productivity shock (or a large positive policy shock) hits the economy.
If the negative shock is so large that Nt cannot decline enough to attain the equilibrium,
then credit will not be supplied.
Figure 11 shows impulse responses to a (annualized) 20% negative deviation of Zt from
the steady state value. In the face of such a large negative shock, the mass of new entrants
immediately takes the value of zero and it takes several periods until the mass of new
entrants restores a positive value. During the zero-entry period, the mass of total firms
decreases at a rate δ and output also declines along with this. Importantly, aggregate
output is no longer positively correlated with the common productivity shock while per-
firm output commoves with the shock. The aggregate output continues to decline even
after the common productivity has started recovering. This will not be the case when the
financial market is under normal conditions, where the amount of credit is always positive.
Such discrepancy in movements between aggregate and per-firm outputs stems from a
25Impulse responses generated by intensive margin are obtained by fixing Nt at the steady state value.
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persistent decline in the mass of firms. The mass of total firms continues to decline until
the financial intermediary becomes able to extend a suﬃcient amount of credit, whereas
each firm’s output and profit may be improved with a common productivity shock provided
the eﬀect of Nt on individual profit, captured by (1− α)/α, is not so large. In this sense,
the appearance of “credit crunch” prolongs the recession in terms of aggregate output, but
this is not necessarily true for per-firm output and profit.
If such a credit crunch emerges, then the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy will largely be
undermined. This is because the credit rationing channel, which is a major source of the
real eﬀects of the nominal interest rate, disappears in the case of NEt = 0. Of course, such
a situation could be avoided by decreasing the nominal interest rate to a level for which
eq. (14) holds with equality. However, since there exists a zero-lower bound of nominal
interest rates, any interest rate cut might not be enough to restore a positive value of NEt .
If this is the case, given that the only policy instrument of the central bank is the nominal
interest rate, then all the central bank can do is wait until the mass of incumbent firms
(and the labor wage) declines to a level for which the relation Γ(z¯t;Zt) = θη˜γf1+φ˜t Z˜αt Nt
holds. Nevertheless, this does not mean that a cut in the nominal interest rate during the
periods of credit crunch is ineﬀective. Although monetary policy is seemingly ineﬀective,
keeping the interest rate at zero helps the credit market to promptly re-equilibrate.26
Figure 11 also shows that the credit spread takes negative values during the period
of zero entry, but this is simply because the equilibrium condition (14) is not satisfied
with equality. The credit spread during the zero-entry period should be interpreted as a
“shadow credit spread”, the level of credit spread that would attain eq. (14) with equality.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper explored a situation in which new entrants have to borrow funds from a finan-
cial intermediary in order to cover entry costs. I showed that credit rationing arises in
equilibrium since the expected profits for prospective entrants are nonnegative. In this en-
vironment, the mass of entry firms depends on the volume of credit financial intermediaries
can supply.
It turns out that a cut in the nominal interest rate leads to an increase in the credit
supply as long as the debt contract is made in nominal terms. Since an improvement in the
availability of credit enhances firm entry, it expands aggregate output as well as per-firm
output and profits. A virtue of this credit rationing channel is that the source of rationing
does not come from the lack of bank liquidity, but from the lack of borrower creditwor-
thiness. In this sense, the transmission mechanism is not inconsistent with Ashcraft and
Campello’s (2007) empirical finding. In addition, the credit rationing channel does not
rely on the presence of price stickiness. The presence of nominal debt contracts gives the
26Mishkin (2009) discusses the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy during financial crises.
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central bank the ability to aﬀect the real economy since the nominal interest rate is a
cost of funds for lending. The intuition is that a reduction in the cost of funds allows the
expected (nominal) revenue of individual lending to decrease, which enables the financial
intermediary to extend credit to less creditworthy borrowers.
The main diﬀerences in the transmission mechanism between the balance sheet channel,
the bank lending channel and the credit rationing channel are summarized in Table 5.27
The credit rationing channel and the balance sheet channel are similar in that the key
policy variable is an interest rate and borrower creditworthiness plays a crucial role in
policy transmission. On the other hand, the credit rationing channel and the bank lending
channel share the property that the presence of rationing is a key to the policy transmission
mechanism, while the sources of supply shortage are diﬀerent.
The traditional balance sheet channel emphasizes that a shift in monetary policy has
real eﬀects through its influence on the borrowers’ net worth. However, it only focuses
on a demand-driven eﬀect of monetary policy, neglecting the presence of financial mar-
ket disequilibrium. If credit demand is greater than credit supply, then monetary policy
can have real eﬀects through a supply-side channel rather than a demand-side channel.
This point will be quite important given the fact that it is necesarily diﬃcult to exactly
control long-term interest rates. In practice, financial institutions usually collect funds
by issuing securities with short-term maturities, typically deposits, even when lending is
based on longer-term contracts. The presence of such maturity transformation suggests
that monetary policy will be more eﬀective if the central bank can influence the economy
by exploiting a supply-side channel rather than a demand-side channel.
The following topics should be addressed in future research: first, it is necessary to
clarify the quantitative importance of the credit rationing channel. To do this, an empirical
work will be needed to quantify the relative size of the two types of credit rationing: type-D
and type-S. Second, price stickiness is absent in this paper. It would be useful to see how
the introduction of price stickiness aﬀects the relative importance of extensive margin to
intensive margin in the presence of the credit rationing channel.
7 Appendix
The steady states of Nt, N
I
t , N
E
t , xt, z¯t, Yt, R
l
t, dt(z¯t), W˜t/Pt can be obtained recursively as
follows:
z¯ =
αzu − μZ
α+ μ
x =
z¯
zu
N =
1
Rθη˜γf1+φ˜Z˜αΓ(z¯;Z)
27These are denoted by BS channel, BL channel and CR channel, respectively.
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NE =
δ
1− x+ δN
N I =
1− x
1− x+ δN
Y =
∙µ θ
θ − 1
¶
γηR
¸ −1
1+φ
N
1
α Z˜
d(z¯) =
1
θ (Z + z¯)
α
∙µ θ
θ − 1
¶
γηR
¸ −1
1+φ
N
1−α
α Z˜1−α
Rl =
d(z¯)
η˜γf1+φ˜Y
W˜
P
= η˜γY f φ˜.
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Table 1: Availability of credit from the main bank
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Credit application was refused or its amount re-
duced (among applicants)
8.6 8.8 6 6.8 9.2
Credit application was accepted with tightened
borrowing conditions (among applicants)
18.1 17.8 15.8 15.9 17.2
Did not submit credit application in the past
year
43 50.9 46.7 49.7 48.7
Source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium Enterprises, The Ministry of Small and Medium
Enterprises Agency.
Table 2: Availability of credit according to the stage of firm growth
initial stage growing stage stable stage total
Have obtained funds as desired 61.3 87.9 97.4 93.9
Have not obtained funds as desired 38.7 12.1 2.6 6.1
Source: White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 2009, The Ministry of
Small and Medium Enterprises Agency. The questionnaire was conducted by Tokyo Shoko
Research Ltd.
Note: Only for SMEs that have an experience of R&D investment.
Table 3: What has made external finance diﬃcult?
Financial institutions’ problems 43.8
Deterioration in the business condition of the related industry 50.6
Deterioration in my company’s profitability 46.4
Deterioration in the asset value of my company and/or the manager 14.2
Others 3.6
Source: White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 2009, The Ministry
of Small and Medium Enterprises Agency. The questionnaire was conducted by Mizuho
Research Institute.
Note: Based on the questionnaire to the SMEs that replied that loans from financial
institutions have become tighter than before.
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Table 4: Equilibrium equations
Threshold of z z¯t =
αzu−μZt
α+μ
Default probability xt = G(z¯t)
No-arbitrage condition (1− xt)(Zt + z¯t)α + (1− μ) R z¯t0 g(z)(Zt + z)αdz = θη˜γf1+φ˜t Z˜αt RtNt
Threshold of profit dt(z¯t) =
1
θ (Zt + z¯t)
α
h³
θ
θ−1
´
γηRt
i −1
1+φ N
1−α
α
t Z˜
1−α
t
Output Yt =
h³
θ
θ−1
´
γηRt
i −1
1+φ N
1
α
t Z˜t
Preparatory-labor wage W˜tPt = η˜γYtf φ˜t
Lending rate Rlt =
dt(z¯t)
W˜tft/Pt
Mass of incumbents N It = (1− δ)N It−1 + (1− xt−1)NEt−1
Mass of new entrants NEt = Nt −N It
Table 5: Classification of the credit channels
BS channel BL channel CR channel
key policy variable interest rate money supply interest rate
eﬀective supply? no yes yes
source of rationing n.a. bank liquidity creditworthiness
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Figure 1: The behaviors of diﬀusion indices regarding external finance conditions (Source:
TANKAN, Bank of Japan)
27
Figure 2: Easiness in external finance and net operating profits (Source: TANKAN, Bank
of Japan)
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Figure 3: Easiness in external finance and firm entry (Source: TANKAN, Bank of Japan,
and White paper on Small and Medium Enterprises 2009, The Ministry of Small and
Medium Enterprise Agency)
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Figure 4: Easiness in external finance and the number of corporate bankruptcies (Source:
TANKAN, Bank of Japan, and Tokyo Shoko Research Ltd.)
Figure 5: Sequence of events
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Figure 6: Graphical illustration of equilibrium credit rationing
Figure 7: The impacts of a positive common productivity shock
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a one-percent positive productivity shock
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a one-percent negative policy shock
33
Figure 10: Output responses: Intensive and extensive margins
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to a 20% negative productivity shock
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